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Abstract Most online communities, such as discussion forums, file-sharing commu-
nities, e-learning communities, and others, suffer from insufficient user participation in
their initial phase of development. Therefore, it is important to provide incentives to
encourage participation, until the community reaches a critical mass and “takes off”.
However, too much participation, especially of low-quality can also be detrimental
for the community, since it leads to information overload, which makes users leave
the community. Therefore, to regulate the quality and the quantity of user contribu-
tions and ensure a sustainable level of user participation in the online community, it
is important to adapt the rewards for particular forms of participation for individual
users depending on their reputation and the current needs of the community. An
incentive mechanism with these properties is proposed. The main idea is to measure
and reward the desirable user activities and compute a user participation measure,
then cluster the users based on their participationmeasure into different classes, which
have different status in the community and enjoy special privileges. For each user, the
reward for each type of activity is computed dynamically based on amodel of commu-
nity needs and an individual user model. The model of the community needs predicts
what types of contributions (e.g. more new papers or more ratings) are most valuable
at the current moment for the community. The individual model predicts the style of
contributions of the user based on her past performance (whether the user tends to
make high-quality contributions or not, whether she fairly rates the contributions of
others). The adaptive rewards are displayed to the user at the beginning of each session
and the user can decide what form of contribution to make considering the rewards
that she will earn. The mechanism was evaluated in an online class resource-sharing
system, Comtella. The results indicate that the mechanism successfully encourages
stable and active user participation; it lowers the level of information overload and
therefore enhances the sustainability of the community.
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1 Introduction
An online community is a group of people who interact in a virtual environment. They
have a common interest or purpose, are supported by technology, and are guided by
norms and policies (Preece 2000).
Depending on the type of the community, people can make different contributions
by sharing opinions, information, blogs, music and video files, photos, etc. Examples
of online communities include discussion boards, like Electric Minds, social networks,
like Orkut, blog systems, like Blogger, photo-sharing communities, like Flickr, and
file-sharing communities, like KaZaA or BitTorrent.
The proliferation of online communities may suggest that the design of a commu-
nity for a particular purpose is straightforward. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Although software providing basic community infrastructure is readily available, it is
not enough to ensure that the community will “take off” and work well. A critical
mass of user participation has to be reached for an online community to survive and
be sustainable (Hiltz and Turoff 1978).
Market-based incentive approaches have been proposed to stimulate participation
in online communities. For example, (Burgahain et al. 2003; Golle et al. 2001) have
proposed game-theoretic incentive mechanisms for peer to peer online communities
using micro-payments to reward individual contributions. However, practical appli-
cations of market mechanisms using micro currency, like Mojo Nation have not been
successful in stimulating participation. Shirky (2003) argued that micro payments
involve a high-cognitive cost for users (the decision of whether to carry out the trans-
action or of “consuming” a shared resource when one needs to pay for it, even a
miniscule amount) and that social rewards, such a fame or status in the community
can be a stronger motivator for participation.
Comtella (Vassileva 2002) exploits exactly this idea. It is a small-scale online com-
munity developed at the MADMUC lab at University of Saskatchewan for sharing
URLs of class-related web-resources (bookmarks) among students. Similar to other
online communities, it also faced the problem of scarcity of user participation and con-
tributions. To address the problem, we proposed amotivational mechanism (Vassileva
et al. 2004), which rewarded contributing users with higher status in the community
and better quality of service. The contributions and participation of each user were
measured and users were able to earn different classes “memberships” in the Com-
tella community: bronze, silver, and gold, each associated with a different interface
and additional search options. The evaluation showed that while the mechanism was
effective in increasing the quantity of contributions, it stimulated some users to try
to game the system (Cheng and Vassileva 2005). To maximize their rewards and
minimize their effort, these users contributed many resources of medium or low qual-
ity. This made it hard for everyone to find good resources in the system, resulting in
disappointment and a decrease in the level of user participation.
This phenomenon happens in online communities and is called “information
overload” (Shenk 1997). Jones and Rafaeli (1999) found that the users’ most common
response to it is to reduce or end their participation in the community. Therefore,
the abundance of user contributions does not necessarily guarantee sustainability of
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an online community. On the contrary, excessive contributions may result in user
withdrawal and may impair the sustainability of the community. In order to ensure
active and stable user participation, we propose a new adaptivemechanism tomeasure
the quality of user contributions, control the overall number of contributions in the
community, and motivate users to contribute high-quality resources. On one side,
the mechanism should encourage users to rate contributions thus ensuring decentral-
ized community moderation. On the other side, the mechanism should influence the
individual users’ actions of contributing by adapting the rewards using a model of
the current needs of the community and a model the users’ individual reputation in
contributing quality resources.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents related work in the
area of collaborative quality evaluation mechanisms. Section 3, presents the pro-
posed mechanism and Sect. 4 describes its implementation in Comtella. Section 5
presents the design and the results of the evaluation. Section 6, discusses the results
and raises some more general issues related to the design of incentive mechanisms in
online communities. Section 7, concludes the paper and outlines directions for future
research.
2 Related Work
To ensure active and sustained user participation and avoid information overload in
the online community, the incentive mechanism has to take into account the quality
of user contributions, i.e. to reward the contributions with high quality, and inhibit the
inferior ones.
It is not easy to measure the quality of each contribution impartially and
accurately because quality measures are mostly subjective. Centralized moderation
is feasible only for small and narrowly focused communities, where members share
similar evaluation criteria. For medium or large online communities (e.g. the ones
with more than 100 users), a decentralized moderation for quality measurement is
necessary. A real world example of decentralized moderation is the impact factor
which measures the quality of journals or papers by counting the times they were
cited. Although it is somewhat controversial whether the impact factor is able to
represent fairly the quality of research papers (e.g. Merton and Zuckerman 1968), it
indicates the extent to which the paper is used by other scholars. In a similar way, one
can measure the quality of a posting in an online community by counting the times it
was viewed (clicked). However, this method is based on the assumption that people
who view a resource hold a positive attitude to its quality, which is not always the
case.
Another way of evaluating the quality of resources or comments is through explicit
user ratings, like for example, the peer-reviewing process in academia and the rating
process in online communities like Slashdot. Since the final evaluations of resources
are computed based on ratings from many users, they are more unbiased. However, a
study of the Slashdot rating mechanism showed that some deserving comments may
receive insufficient attention and end up with an unfair score, especially the ones with
lower initial rating and those that were contributed late in the discussion (Lampe and
Resnick 2004). The reason for this is that low-rated or late contributions have a lower
chance to be read by others (since they select contributions to read based on their
rating), and therefore, a lower chance to get rated. The same effect appears in the
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majority of decentralized qualitymeasurement systems and it is sometimes referred to
the “rich get richer” or “Matthew effect” (Merton andZuckerman 1968). It is impossi-
ble to prevent this effect and ensure a totally fair mechanism in a decentralized rating
system since the resources with high ratings inevitably become more visible and tend
to be viewed and rated more often. However, knowledge of this effect can help an
individual to develop strategies to achieve a better standing. Obviously, the timeliness
of contributing resources is important and users should be encouraged to contrib-
ute early because late contributions are unable to receive enough attention and are
therefore less useful for the community. This is especially relevant in a class-support
system like Comtella or I-Help (Greer et al. 2001) since the topics typically change
on a weekly basis and late contributions tend to be neglected. Apart from playing
a role in the likelihood that a contribution will be read and rated, the timeliness of
the contributions reflects the needs of the community. Early in the discussion period,
when there are notmany contributions, it is important for the community to bring new
contributions, so that there are enough materials to be read. Later, when the num-
ber of contributions is already high, it is more important for the community that the
users rate the contributions, since in this way they provide guidance for other users in
finding good contributions. Therefore, the rewards for different types of cooperative
activities (e.g. sharing new resources; giving ratings) should be different, depending
on the current needs of the community.
A challenge in all systems that rely on decentralized moderation is to ensure that
there are enough user ratings. Beenen et al. (2004) proposed to send users e-mail invi-
tations to encourage them to rate movies in MovieLens, which increased the ratings
in the system. However, this approach is questionable as a long-term solution since
the effect of receiving email-invitations will likely wear off. To stimulate users to rate
resources constantly, persistent incentives are necessary.
The evaluation of our hierarchical memberships motivational mechanism (Cheng
and Vassileva 2005) showed that different users had different contribution patterns.
Some contributed many but poor-quality resources, and others contributed few but
high-quality resources. Therefore, the incentive mechanism should be adaptive to
the patterns of contributions of different users. The mechanism should stimulate the
users with high-reputation, i.e. those contributing few but high-quality resources, to
contribute more and it should inhibit contributions from users with low-reputation,
who contribute many low-quality resources, unless they improve the quality of their
contributions.
In addition, themechanism should adapt to the total number of resources desirable
in the online community. For example, the rewards for contributing new resources
should be decreased, if there are already too many resources in the community that
could cause information overload. However, how to decide what amount of resources
is desirable is an open question. In a context of a class-support community, the instruc-
tor may be able to specify a desirable number of contributions, based on previous
experience, and knowledge about the availably of resources for each topic.
Next, an incentive mechanism with the qualities discussed above is proposed. It
aims to encourage users to rate resources, and depending on the quality evaluation
from user ratings, the mechanism is able to adapt the rewards of different forms
of participation for individual users, depending on their reputations and the current
needs of the community. The goal is to influence the users’ contributions in terms of
both sharing resources and rating resources so that they benefit the community the
most.
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3 Proposed Incentive Mechanism
The proposed mechanism consists of two parts: a mechanism encouraging users to
rate resources and an adaptive reward mechanism.
3.1 Encouraging users to rate contributions
The proposed collaborative rating mechanism is inspired by the Slashdot moderation
system. In order to have a broader source of ratings, all users can rate others’ con-
tributions. Each user receives a limited number of rating points to give out. She can
award any contribution +1 or −1 point depending on whether she likes or dislikes it,
consuming one of her rating points (Fig. 1). The users with higher membership levels
receive more points to give out, which makes themmore influential in the community.
To ensure that all contributions have an equal chance to be read and rated initially, the
initial rating for every new contribution is zero regardless of its providers’membership
level or the quality of her previous contributions (unlike Slashdot, where the postings
of the users with higher karma start at a higher rating). In the end, the final rating for
each contribution is calculated as the sum of all the ratings that it has obtained, i.e. it is
the summative rating, rather than the average rating. The summative rating (“Earned
Ratings” in Fig. 1) for each contribution is displayed in the list of search results, which
can be sorted by the user and viewed as a “top 10” list of articles for any topic.
The “Fake” option allows users to option to “report” duplicated links, broken links,
or links that require subscription. “Fake count” shows the number of times a link was
reported as fake (by default 0) and is used to signal that the user does not need to
spend time and click on it.
As a persistent incentive for users to rate contributions, a virtual currency is intro-
duced, called “c-point”. The c-points are different from the rating points mentioned
above. Initially, each user has only a limited number of c-points. Whenever, the user
rates a contribution, she is awarded a certain number of c-points, depending on her
reputation of giving high-quality ratings. The user can invest the earned c-points to
increase the initial visibility in the search result list of her contributions. Most users
prefer their contributions to appear in salient positions in the search result list, e.g. in
the first place or among the top 10, because in those positions they will have a better
chance to be read and rated. The Comtella search facility displays by default all the
contributions matching a query in a sorted list according to the number of c-points
Fig. 1 A segment of a search results list
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allocated by the contributors (Fig. 1) and then sorted by the time of submission. To
compensate the weakness of Slashdot, the proposed mechanism allows the user the
flexibility to invest any number of their c-points in a particular posting to increase
its visibility, so even if a resource was contributed late in the week, it will have a
chance to be seen and rated. However, in order to earn c-points, the users have to
rate resources contributed by others. The c-points are earned immediately after users
give a rating, bringing instant gratification to the user. Since the users with higher
membership levels get more ratings to give out, they can rate more articles, and are
potentially able to earn more c-points.
3.2 Overview of the adaptive rewards mechanism
The adaptive reward mechanism is introduced as an improvement of the mechanism
of hierarchical memberships, proposed in (Cheng and Vassileva 2005; Vassileva et
al. 2004). The basic idea is to adapt the rewards for different forms of participation
for individual users to the user’s current reputation (based on the quality of their
contributions so far) and the current needs of the community. The individual rewards
for each type of action are displayed in personalized motivational messages, which
the user sees at login, outlining what the community expects from the user in terms of
quantity and quality of contributions. As shown in (Beenen et al. 2004), personalized
messages stating specific performance goals were effective in influencing and directing
the users’ behavior of contributing ratings in MovieLens. Therefore, we expect that
our approach would also influence the user’s behavior in a desirable way. Figure 2,
presents an overview of the mechanism. The adaptive rewards are calculated using
two models: a community model and an individual model.
Fig. 2 An overview of adaptive reward mechanism
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3.3 Community model
The community model is used to describe the current phase in the community needs.
It includes the expected number of resources that should be contributed by all the
users for the current topic (QC) and the community reward factor (FC). For each
week, when a new class topic is introduced,QC is set by the community administrator
(e.g. the instructor of the course) for the current topic, depending on her knowledge
of certain features of the topic (e.g. how interesting it is expected to be for the stu-
dents, the relative amount of materials available online that could be shared) and the
users’ situation (e.g. how much time and energy the students can devote, depending
on their coursework, exams, etc.). FC reflects the extent to which newly contributed
resources are useful for the whole community. Generally, new resources are needed as
soon as possible after a topic has been announced or opened for discussion and those
resources that are contributed late in the period are less useful than the ones con-
tributed early. Therefore, FC has its maximum value when a new topic is introduced
and decreases gradually with the time. After the middle of the discussion period, it
decreases faster (Fig. 3).
3.4 Individual model
Each user has an individualmodel that keeps her reputation of contributing high-qual-
ity resources (which we will call “user’s resource-reputation” for the sake of brevity)
and her reputation of giving high-quality ratings (we will call it “user’s rating-reputa-
tion”). The individual user model contains also the data describing the user’s current
membership level. Since the summative rating of a resource denotes its quality, a
user’s resource reputation (denoted as CI) is defined in a straightforward way as the
average summative rating of all the resources she has shared so far.
However, the quality of the user’s ratings cannot be defined so easily, since the
ratings are by nature subjective. Although in educational online community instruc-
tors or teaching assistants may have the ability to evaluate the quality of ratings, the
workload of evaluating all user ratings is overwhelming. Moreover, in other types of
online communities there are no such arbiters available. We chose to measure the
quality of each rating by the difference between it and the average of all the ratings
the resource gets eventually: the smaller the difference, the higher the quality of the
rating. Accordingly, a user’s rating reputation (RI) is defined as the reciprocal of the
Fig. 3 The changing of the
community reward factor (FC)
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average difference between all ratings she hasmade and the respective average ratings
of the rated resources. Formula (1) shows how RI is calculated.
RI = N∑N
i=1 |ri − ri|
(1)
Here ri(i = 1, 2, 3, . . .,N) are the ratings the user has made; and ri(i = 1, 2, 3, . . .,N)
are the average ratings of the respective resources. This approach for computing
the user’s rating-reputation is based on the assumption that the average rating of a
resource reflects the opinion of the majority of users and is therefore less biased.
Since this metric can be easily skewed, if users intentionally rate close to the average
rating of the resource, the average rating is never shown; only the summative rating
of each resource is shown in the list of search results, as explained in the beginning of
Sect. 3.
The expected number of resources contributed by the individual user (QI) is a
fraction of QC. The users with higher resource-reputation CI will get a larger QI,
which means the users with a good resource reputation are expected to make more
contributions while the expected total number of contributions from all users is fixed.
If details are ignored, Formula (2) demonstrates how QC is distributed among users.
QI ≈ QC • CI∑CI (2)
QI is the number of resources expected from the user.
QC is the expected sum of resources desired from all users.
CI is the user’s resource reputation.
The individual reward factor (FI) defines the extent to which the resources contrib-
uted by the user are being rewarded. Users are not encouraged to make contributions
after they have exceeded their expected number of contributions (QI). So FI is a
function that is a constant value as long as the number of the user’s contributions
is less than or equal to her QI. When the number exceeds the expectation, FI drops
to one fourth of the constant value instantaneously and keeps decreasing with the
increment of the users’ contributions (Fig. 4).
3.5 How the mechanism works
Before explaining the adaptive rewards mechanism, we need to introduce briefly
the scoring model that we proposed in (Cheng and Vassileva 2005). It was used to
measure the contributions made by users and to determine each user’s membership
level. Generally, the comprehensive evaluation of the user’s contributions (Voe) was
Fig. 4 The changing of the
individual reward factor (FI)
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based on the number of times (Ti) the user made a contribution of a certain form
(here we consider two forms of contribution: share a link to a paper or give a rating,
but there can be more rewarded forms of contribution in general) and the weights
introduced to denote the importance of each form of the contribution (Wi). Voe





Wi · Ti (3)
According to their values of Voe, users were classified into several levels of mem-
bership. Those with higher values of Voe would obtain higher-level membership (e.g.
silver or gold), and consequently gain more prestige and other rewards in the com-
munity (see Fig. 2).
In the adaptive reward mechanism, instead of fixed constants for the weights (Wi),
varying weights Wi(t) are used for the different forms of contribution (e.g. sharing
resources, giving ratings). If we represent with t = (1, 2, 3, . . .,Ti) the sequence of the
contributions of each form, the overall evaluation of a user’s contributions (Voe) is











Wemainly consider two forms of contribution: sharing a resource and contributing
a rating. The weights Wi(t) for each form of contribution are modeled as discrete
functions of time and depend on the states of the user’s individual model and the
community model at the current time. The current values of the weights are shown to
the user at logon time in a personalized message, so that she can see what rewards she
will receive for contributing a new resource and for rating resources contributed by
others. Each personalized motivational message informs the user about the number
of resources expected from her for the current topic (QI) and, if the user’s CI (the
reputation for sharing) orRI (the reputation for rating) is lower than a certain thresh-
old, a reminder is displayed for her to pay attention to the quality of the resources or
the ratings that she will contribute.
The adaptive weight for sharing resources (WS) is calculated through Formula (5).
Here WS0 is a constant, which is the initial value of the weight.
WS = WS0 • FC • FI (5)
FC is the community reward factor.
FI is the individual reward factor.
WS is equal to WS0, its initial constant value, when a new topic begins and the
number of the user’s contributions has not reached their expected value QI. After
that, it decreases gently with time as FC does (Fig. 3). Whenever the number of the
user’s contributions goes beyond her QI, WS sharply decreases to 1/4 of its original
value (as FI does in Fig. 4) and continues to decrease with the accumulation of the
user’s contributions and time.
It can be seen that WS inherits the features of both reward factors, Fc and FI. In
this way, a user who shares many resources but does not care about their quality gets
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a low CI (the user’s reputation of contributing resources) and a small QI (the num-
ber of resources expected from her) and therefore, little reward for her subsequent
contributions. Thus, the personalized message to the user would be to contribute less
new resources and try to improve their quality. This situation continues until the user
finally improves her reputation in sharing.
On the other hand, if a user tends to share a small number of good resources, she
obtains a high CI and a large QI. This user will earn more rewards by sharing new
resources unless she starts compromising the quality. For both kinds of users, early
contributed resources always earn more rewards. Hence, the adaptive weight WS is
able to restrict the quantity of user contributions, elicit the contributions from the
users with a good reputation, discourage contributions from users who ignore quality
and stimulate users to share early in the discussion period.
The adaptive weight for giving ratings (WR) is proportional to the user’s reputation
of giving high-quality ratings (RI) and is updated according to Formula (6), where K
is a constant.
WR = K • RI(K is a constant) (6)
The users who have gained a good rating reputation get higher weight for their
subsequent ratings, which should stimulate them to rate more resources. However,
thosewith lowRI will not get rewards for rating. They have to rate less and improve the
quality of their ratings to win their reputation back and this would be the suggestion
of the personalized message.
4 Implementation of the mechanism in the New Comtella System
The mechanism presented in the previous section was implemented in a version of
the Comtella system, which was used as a test environment for the evaluation of the
mechanism. Another version of the system, with very similar “look and feel”, but
using just the hierarchical memberships mechanism (Cheng and Vassileva 2005) was
implemented too to serve as a control environment in the evaluation. Next, we will
focus only on the design of the test system including the mechanism.
Figure 5 shows the “welcome page” (the front page) of the test system. On this
page, the following information and features are provided for the user as follows:
• The user’s contribution levels in the previous week and in the current week. The
different forms of user contributions (e.g. sharing, rating) are evaluated separately,
so that theuser knows,whichone to emphasize. To enhance themotivational effect,
the contribution levels shown are updated immediately after the contributions are
made.
• The weights for different forms of contributions. To limit the variable space so that
it is possible to evaluate the proposedmechanism, in this version of Comtella, only
two forms of contribution, sharing articles and giving ratings, are considered (we
could have considered, for example, also giving comments or discussing links in
the discussion forum). However, not only the number of times these two activities
are performed, but also the quality of articles shared and of the ratings made are
taken into account in the participationmeasure. The weights for different forms of
contribution are listed at Table 1.The user’s current membership level. It is updated
weekly, based on the comprehensive evaluation of the user’s contributions in the
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Fig. 5 The welcome page of Comtella
Table 1 Weights for different forms of contribution
Weights Description Value
WSN Weight for the quantity of
resources contributed
Varying depending on the average
quality of resources the user shared
and the current need of the system
WSQ Weight for the quality of resources
contributed
Constant
WRN Weight for the quantity of ratings
made
Varying depending on average
quality of ratings made by the user.
WRQ Weight for the quality of ratings
made
Constant
previous week. The users’ memberships are updated at the beginning of each
week, based on their contribution levels in the previous week. The comprehensive
evaluation of the user’s contributions is computed through formula (3).
• Personalized messages for the user. The personalized messages inform the user
of the number of articles she should share for the current topic and also remind
the user to pay attention to the quality of her contributions and ratings when
necessary.
• Community news. The community administrator (e.g. the instructor) can inform
the users about events in community and provide course information such as dead-
lines for submitting assignments, time and place of examinations, etc. Besides, gold
members are also allowed to release community news, as one of their privileges.
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• Top users and best papers of last week. The top users and the best papers of the
previous week are announced in the welcome page, as another stimulation to con-
tribute. The top users are those three or four users with the highest comprehensive
level of contributions in the system. Five – seven of the best papers (with the top-
three summative ratings) are shown in the best-paper list together with the users
who contributed them.
The rating interface is embedded in the “searchpage”of the system (Fig. 1), through
which the user can rate the articles immediately after searching and viewing them.
The current total of earned ratings and the times the article was viewed are shown for
each article allowing the user to select for reading articles that have received highest
number of ratings or that been viewed most often by others. By default, the articles
are sorted in the list by the number of c-points and their sharing time. The users can
re-sort them by article title, number of earned ratings or view-times.
Whenever the user rates an article, she earns a certain number of c-points. This
number depends on the user’s reputation of giving ratings, evaluated with formula (1).
To stimulate users to consume their c-points sooner and ratemore articles, the c-points
are effective only within two weeks after they are obtained. When sharing a resource,
the user has the option to invest a certain number of c-points in the resource (Fig. 6).
The user can decide how many c-points to attach to the article, depending on how
interesting, readable and relevant they think it is. However, to avoid the unbounded
competition for the largest number of c-points, there is a limit (50 c-points) to the
number of c-points that can be invested in one article.
There are four hierarchical membership levels in the new Comtella system—Gold,
Silver, Bronze, and Plain (Plastic) member. The user interfaces provided for themem-
bers with different memberships are different in appearance and color, but same in
terms of functionality. Although higher level members are not offered additional
functions, they have certain privileges in the community. For example, they receive
more ratings to give out, which makes them more influential in the community. Also,
Gold members are enabled to publish news-items in the Community News.
5 Evaluation of the Proposed Mechanism
To test whether the mechanism discussed in the previous section can achieve the
goals of regulating the quality and quantity of contributions and ensuring sustained
Fig. 6 The interface for sharing resources in Comtella
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Hierarchical Memberships  
Showing Contribution Levels in
Previous and Current Week
 
Interface for Rating Articles  
Cpoints as Reward for Rating  ×
Adaptive Weights for Sharing and
Rating
 ×
Personalized Messages  ×
participation in online communities, an evaluation based on the Comtella system was
carried out. It aimed to answer the following questions:
• Will the users in the test group rate articles more actively?
• How well will the summative ratings reflect the real quality of the articles?
• Will the users tend to share resources earlier in the week?
• Will the actual number of contributions be close to the desired one?
• Will the users share the number of articles that is expected from them?
• Will the users contribute a higher percentage of high-quality articles?
• Will there be information overload?
According to the evaluation plan, the users were divided into two groups: a test
group and a control group. Two different Comtella systems were created to serve the
two groups which were identical except for the extra features (see Table 2) provided
by the new mechanism that were offered only in the system for the test group.
5.1 Evaluation Design
After the two systems were set up, a case study was launched in a class on Ethics
and Information Technology offered in the 2004–2005 winter session to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. The participants were encouraged to use
the system to shareWeb-articles related to the topic of each week. The course content
involves extremely broad spectrum of issues, ranging from freedom of speech and
the internet, to privacy, to intellectual property, to workplace issues, discrimination,
outsourcing, etc. Many of these issues are discussed widely in the press in news stories,
recent court case developments, relevant issues as reflected in political campaigns, etc.
Requiring students to find and share articles in Comtella pursued several goals. The
first goal was to share the onerous task of looking up all these articles so that the
instructor is not overloaded. The second goal is to awake the students’ awareness
of ethical issues as they appear in the real world reflected in the media rather than
viewing the course as purely “academic”, abstract content and textbook cases. The
most interesting stories found by the students were discussed in class from ethical
perspective, the students took sides and argued for the different viewpoints or the
different stakeholders involved in the story. Comtella provides a good platform for
the students to share and receive extensively the newest information. The rating sys-
tem helps to share the heavy workload of evaluation the relevance and quality of the
stories among all the users, thereby making it feasible. According to the curriculum, a
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different topic was introduced in each week except that the same topic was discussed
in the fourth week and the fifth week. In total, eight topics were discussed during the
study. Five percent (5%) of the final mark in the course was based on the number of
shared articles and another 5%was based on the quality of the weekly summaries that
the students had to write of an article chosen by them, from those shared in Comtella
as follows:
• Participants
The participants were 31 fourth-year undergraduate students who took the course.
They were assigned into two groups: a test group of 15 users and a control group
of 16 users. To account for cultural and gender-based differences in the users’ initial
predisposition for participation, the assignment of students to groups was based on
having equal proportion of Canadian to foreign and male to female students in each
group. Besides the stratification for nationality and gender, the students were ran-
domly assigned to the two groups. Before the study, all the participants voluntarily
signed consent forms, which granted us permission to use their data.
• Methods
To evaluate the effect of the improved incentive mechanisms, we compared the
behaviours of the test group, which used the system with all the features of the
mechanism and the control group, which used the system where some functions were
blocked, as shown in Table 1. To avoid the effects that the contribution patterns of
one group can have impact on the behavior of the other group, the two groups formed
completely separated online communities, and shared different articles. We tried to
make the two systems visually as similar as possible; they shared the same entry
(URL) and students were automatically redirected, so that it was hard to notice that
there were different systems for different users. The system for the control group was
not weaker one in terms of system functionality and usability. It just did not offer the
features of the new incentive mechanism. Yet the students in both groups followed
the same class schedule and shared lectures, classroom, and coursework throughout
the study. We could not inhibit students talking with each other in the class, neither
could we put them into two different classrooms. Therefore, we could not guarantee
that there was no influence between the two groups, but we did what was possible to
minimize the influence.
After the evaluation, a post-experiment questionnaire was distributed to the par-
ticipants to collect feedback about their experiences in their online communities.
Comtella was programmed to record the times and the types of various user actions
and contributions in the online communities, including logging on the system, sharing,
reading and rating articles, commenting on articles, uploading summaries, etc.
5.2 Results
The data from the system-logs and the post-experiment questionnaire showed the
following results.
5.2.1 The users in the test group were more active in rating articles
The system logs showed that the number of ratings given in the test group was
consistently higher than that in the control group in each week (Fig. 7).



































Test Group 39 77 127 137 118 147 135 138 147
Control Group 24 55 53 59 37 85 98 93 89
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fig. 7 The number of ratings contributed in the two groups in each week
Throughout the 9weeks, the difference between the total number of ratings in both
groups was significant, resulting in a total of 1,065 ratings in the test group and 593
ratings in the control group. The percentage of the articles rated was also higher in
the test group than in the control group (78.3 vs. 53.3%). We also counted the ratings
contributed by each individual user and applied theMann–Whitney test (Lowry 1999)
to verify the hypothesis that the users in the test group rated articles more actively
than those in the control group. The results of the test showed that the z-ratio was
equal to 1.727, which confirmed the hypothesis with statistical significance beyond the
0.05 level. This clearly shows that the proposed incentive mechanism with c-points
and the associated rewards showed sustained effectiveness in stimulating users to rate
articles during the experiment. Besides, the users’ attitudes toward the c-points were
mostly positive. Among the 15 users in the test group, nine users (60%) indicated in
the questionnaires that the c-points were useful to make their articles more visible to
others; eleven of them (73.3%) used more than 40% of all the c-points they earned to
make their contributed articles more visible. Of all the c-points awarded to the users,
62.8% were attached to articles.
5.2.2 The articles with higher ratings were more likely to be chosen
by users to summarize
This result was found by analyzing users’ activity-logs in both systems. We observed
that the articles with higher summative ratings were chosen by the students for sum-
marization1 more frequently.We can safely assume that the students tended to choose
interesting or good-quality articles to summarize because they desired goodmarks for
their summaries. The attention and the effort they paid to the articles they chose also
indicated the articles were valuable. So the number of times an article was chosen can
be used as an indicator of its quality. Then the correlation between articles’ ratings
and the number of the times they were chosen can be explained by two hypotheses:
(i) The articles’ summative ratings reflect well the quality of the articles, therefore
they showed a correlation with the number of times the articles were summa-
rized.
1 Writing summaries was a weekly-based assignment of the course; the students were free to choose
to summarize any of the articles shared for the topic of the week.
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(ii) The students tend to choose articles by looking at their summative ratings. If
this hypothesis is true, the correlation does not mean that the ratings correctly
reflect the quality of the articles.
In the exit questionnaire the users were asked whether they chose articles to sum-
marize according to the summative ratings or the times the articles were viewed or
none of these two indicators. Seven users answered that their selection was guided
by the summative ratings; two users answered that their choice was guided by the
number of times the articles were viewed; the remaining 22 users (71.0%) indicated
that they chose articles based on none of these two indicators.
Since there is a connection between the article’s summative rating and the number
of times it was viewed, we removed from consideration the data from the seven users
who looked at the ratings and the two users who looked at the number of view-times,
and took into account only the data from the 22 users who stated that they did not
choose articles based on any of these indicators. The results still showed a strong cor-
relation between the articles’ rating and the number of times they were summarized
by the 22 users. Table 3 shows that the articles that earned higher ratings were on
average chosen and summarized more often. Since these 22 users selected articles
according to neither the summative ratings nor the number of view-times and the
correlation between the articles’ summative ratings and the number of times they
were chosen by these users is statistically evident, we can conclude that the articles’
summative ratings are able to reflect their quality.
An interesting result is that although there was no limit on the type or the length
of the articles that could be shared, most of the articles shared by the users in the
two groups were magazine articles, which were very popular and easy to read. Some
academic papers were also shared during the study but their number was small. The
articles with high summative ratings were usually the ones that were easy to read
and understand and presented original viewpoints, so they were very interesting sto-
ries. Academic papers that were long and more profound were usually ignored by
the users. So the quality reflected by summative ratings indicated the interestingness
and readability of the articles rather than the technical or academic quality of the
articles.
Table 3 The relation between the articles’ summative ratings and the times they were summarized
by the users
R N T N/T
Greater than 4 7 5 0.714
4 26 15 0.577
3 89 31 0.348
2 167 34 0.204
1 303 39 0.129
0 47 7 0.149
Less than 0 154 6 0.039
Not rated 407 18 0.044
R: Summative rating
N: The number of the articles that had the rating shown in column R
T: The total times these articles were chosen for summarization (by the 22 users)
N/T: The number of times these articles were chosen on average
User Model User-Adap Inter (2006) 16:321–348 337
5.2.3 The users in the test group were more satisfied with the summative
ratings received by their articles
We found that the users in the test group were more satisfied with the summative
ratings that their contributions received from other users. The data from the ques-
tionnaire showed that 53% of the users (eight users) in the test group thought that
the final ratings received by the articles they shared reflected fairly their quality, while
in the control group only 31% (five users) thought so. This is partly because the users
of the control group rated fewer of their contributions than users of the test group.
The ratio of the articles to the ratings in the test group is 1: 1.74 and that in the control
group is 1: 1.01. Around half (46.7%) of the articles shared in the control group were
not rated at all while in the test group only 21.7% were unrated. More deserving
articles did not receive ratings in the community of the control group than in the test
group community. Apparently, the quality evaluation based on collaborative rating
requires a critical number of user ratings. Before this number is reached, increasing
the number of user ratings in the system through incentives can improve the accuracy
of the quality evaluation of the shared resources.
5.2.4 The users in the test group tended to share resources earlier in the week
The system-logs showed that the users in both groups shared more articles in the first
half of each week than in the second half. By “week” we mean a calendar week of
7 days, since students still could submit articles for credit until Sunday midnight and
many did use the weekend for their Comtella activities. Yet, 66.1% of all the articles
in both systems were contributed in the first 3 days of the week. The users in the test
group shared a higher percentage of their contributions in the first 3 days (71.3%) than
the users in the control group (60.6%) and the difference between the two groups was
quite large in each week (ranging between 7 and 14%).
In Comtella, one topic was active in the system for only 1week and the resources
shared for the topic could be rated only in that week. So the resources posted earlier in
theweek gainedmore time and chance to attract attention and to collect ratings, which
was realized by 17 users (54.8%) across the two groups (according to the data from
the questionnaire). This explained why the users in both groups tended to contribute
articles in the first half of the week.
The higher percentage of early contributions in the test group proved that the adap-
tive reward mechanism was effective in motivating users to share resources early. The
reason for this conclusion is that the adaptive reward mechanism was applied only
in the system used by the test group and it was the only difference between the two
systems that was related to the timeliness of making contributions. For the users of
test group, the adaptive weight for sharing resources deceased with time.
5.2.5 There was no big difference between the total numbers of shared articles across
the two groups: In the test group, more than half of the users tried to share the
number of articles that was expected from them. the overall number of articles
in the test group was not excessive
The difference between the total numbers of articles shared over 9weeks in the two
groups was small. There were 613 articles shared in the test group vs. 587 in the control
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group, i.e. the total number of submitted articles by the test and control groups during
the experiment varied with only with ±2.16% from the average of 600 articles. In the
control group, the quality of the contributions was not taken into account, so the users
could have easily shared more articles to receive higher membership levels. However,
even though this incentive existed, the users did not contribute excessively.
This may be due to the characters of the students in the control group. Some people
are easy to be motivated by glory and recognition, and some are not. Even the pres-
ence of just one person with “greed” for higher status may have lead to an evolving
competition, which could have tipped the system into a different state. In fact, this is
exactly what happened in the previous version of the system, experimented in 2004
(Cheng and Vassileva 2005).
The number of articles contributed by each user ranged from 3 to 111 in the test
group and from 0 to 124 in the control group. The standard deviation in the test group
was slightly smaller than that in the control group (29.4 vs. 32.1).
The users of the test group were asked in the final questionnaire whether they
followed the suggested number of contributions. Eight users (53% out of 15) re-
sponded positively. We calculated for each user the average difference between the
actual shared number and the expected number over 9weeks and found that for eight
of the users (53%) the average differences were less than 2, which means these eight
users almost contributed the number of articles that was expected from them. Inter-
estingly, the two groups of eight users did not entirely overlap. Table 4 shows each
user’s answer to this question and the average of the differences between the actual
number of articles she shared and the number expected from her in the 9weeks. These
results indicate that more than half of the users in the test group were persuaded to
share resources in or close to the number that was expected from them.
Table 4 The difference between the users’ real and expected contributions

















Did you pay attention to the number of articles the system expects you to contribute?
Four options:
Yes - Yes, I tried to share in the number the system expected.
More - I always shared more than the number.
Less - I always shared less than the number.
No - I did not care about that number; I shared as many as I wanted.
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In the test group, the total number of contributions did not have a big discrepancy
from the overall expected number for most of the topics since about half of the users
tried to share the number expected from them and the extra contributions made by
users who tended to share more were compensated roughly in the same number by
the contributions of users who tended to share less. Table 5 shows the differences
between the total number of shared articles and the overall expected number for the
eight topics.
It can be seen that the differences for all the topics were less than 20% except for
Topic 3, 5, and 8. The students over-contributed for Topic 3 possibly because the topic
(“Wiretapping and encryption”) happened to be of highest interest for them.We have
yet to find an explanation for the large difference between the expected and actual
number of contributions for Topic 5. The overall difference for the eight topics was
equal to 12.3% of the total of the expected numbers. This shows that the number of
articles in the test group was not excessive and the approach of setting specific goal
for each user to contribute was helpful to control the overall quantity of resources in
the system.
5.2.6 In both groups, the users’ attitude towards the quality of the articles were
generally neutral
As for the quality of the articles in both systems, the questionnaire asked the users
in both the control and test group to give the rough estimate of the percentages of
articles with high, medium and low quality in their respective systems. The data in
Table 6 shows the averages of users’ estimations, which indicates that their attitude
toward the quality of the articles in their own communities was mostly neutral.
Table 5 The differences between the actual number and the expected number in the test group for
the eight topics
Topic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Sum
Week 1 2 3 4 & 5 6 7 8 9
E 60 60 61 121 62 62 60 60 546
A 57 66 98 121 83 72 69 47 613
D −3 6 37 0 21 10 9 −13 67
−5.0% 10.0% 60.7% 0.0% 33.9% 16.1% 15.0% −21.7% 12.3%
The same topic was discussed in week 4 and 5. So there was only one expected number for both of
the weeks.
E: The expected number of articles shared for the topic.
A: The actual number of articles shared.
D: The difference between A and E, equal to (A-E).
P: The percentage of the difference, equal to (A-E)/E.
Table 6 The users’ estimations of the percentages of the articles with high, medium and low quality
in both groups
Group High (%) Medium (%) Low (%)
Test Group 23.5 47.1 29.4
Control Group 27.3 41.5 31.1
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However, it is hard to compare the quality of the articles in the two groups because
the users in any group had experience only in one system, the articles shared in each
community were different, and the users might have had different criteria of quality
evaluation.
5.2.7 The users in the test group were more active in terms of logging on the system
and reading articles
The analysis based on the system-logs showed that the users in the test group partici-
pated in the system more actively than the users in control group did. The number of
times of reading articles and logging on the system were computed for both groups
of users over 9weeks. Figures 8 and 9 show the average number of times/actions of
accessing articles (possibly reads) and logon actions in both groups over the 9weeks.
In each week, on average, the users in the test group consistently readmore articles
and logged on the system more times than the users in the control group (except that



























Test Group 22.3 27.2 38.2 31.4 11.4 24.9 25.2 24.6 21.9 
Control Group 19.1 22.6 20.3 10.1 9.0 18.0 16.6 18.0 14.6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9





















Test Group 9.7 12.1 19.6 13.8 11.1 9.1 11.1 16.9 10.9 
Control Group 11.9 9.1 8.8 5.6 5.9 4.9 5.4 5.3 4.4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fig. 9 The average number of times of logon for the users in both groups
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the study, the total number of times of reading in the test group and in the control
group were 3,407 and 2,373, respectively; the total number of logon times were 1,714
and 982. This clearly shows that the activities of reading articles and logging on the
system in the test group were more frequent than those in the control group, which
means that the proposed mechanism could ensure more active and sustained user
participation. A noteworthy fact is that these activities were not rewarded in either
of the systems. Therefore, the more active user participation in the test group can not
be directly attributed to a particular incentive in the mechanism.
One possible explanation could be that the test group users’ more active participa-
tion in reading articles and logon is a by-product of stimulating them to rate articles.
However, this is not the case. After analyzing the relevant data, we found no corre-
lation between the number of ratings contributed and the times of reading articles or
the times of logon in both systems during the 9weeks. Table 7 shows the number of
ratings contributed, the number of times the users read articles and the number of
times they logged on the system in each of the 9weeks for both groups.
Obviously, more ratings in a particular week are not related to more readings or
more logons in that week (e.g. for the test group, Week 9 and for the control group,
Week 7). We also computed for both systems the correlation coefficients of the num-
ber of ratings and the times of reading or logon over the 9weeks (see Table 6). It can
be seen that none of them is greater than 0.25, which clearly shows that the activities
of reading and logon are not correlated with rating in either system. Actually, for
all the users in both groups, the numbers of the articles they read are far more than
the numbers of articles they rated. The system-logs showed that the users rated on
average only about 30% of the articles they read. The users of the test group rated
a higher percentage than those of the control group (34.6 vs. 25.7%). Obviously, the
users could rate more articles that they had read without any extra effort of reading
additional articles, since there were plenty of articles that they had read but not rated
yet. Therefore, the incentive mechanism was able to increase the proportion of the
articles the users rated from the articles they read, but did not stimulate users to read
more articles. This explains why more ratings in particular weeks did not guarantee
more times of reading articles in those weeks during the study. Similarly, Table 6 shows
that there is no correlation between the users rating and logging in the system. The
users logged on the system for various purposes and they could rate as many articles
Table 7 The number of ratings, the times of reading and number of logon actions in each week and
the correlation coefficients for both groups
Week Test Group Control Group
Rating Reading Logon Rating Reading Logon
1 39 335 145 24 306 191
2 77 408 181 55 361 146
3 127 573 294 53 325 140
4 137 471 207 59 162 89
5 118 171 166 37 144 94
6 147 374 137 85 288 79
7 135 378 167 98 265 87
8 138 369 253 93 288 85
9 147 328 164 89 234 71
Correlation coefficient
with the no. of ratings
0.124 0.246 0.067 −0.757
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as they wanted during one logon. So the motivational mechanism’s effect on encour-
aging users to rate articles had no influence on their activities of reading articles or
logging on.
In addition to the difference in the numbers of reading and logon actions between
the two groups, we also observed that in the control group the number of logons
decreased during the 9weeks and showed a negative correlation with the number of
ratings because ratings increased during the study (see Table 6). However, in the test
group no such decrease was observed. This gives some hint that the levels of infor-
mation overload are different in the two groups. Jones’ and Rafaeli’s (1999) research
indicated that information overload results in a decrease or end of the users’ participa-
tion in online communities. The results from our previous study (Cheng and Vassileva
2005) also showed that the users’ contributions and participation decreased after
the system was flooded with shared articles. Evidently, user participation is roughly
in inverse proportion to the level of information overload in the online community
provided that there are no motivational factors working on the users. Since reading
articles and logging on system are not among the activities that were rewarded by the
proposed mechanism in any of the groups group, the difference between the users’
levels of engaging in these activities in the two groups shows that the information
overload in the test group was less serious than that in the control group.
6 Discussion
6.1 Confirmed hypotheses
The data from the evaluation showed that throughout the study, the users in the
test group consistently contributed more ratings than the users in the control group,
which supports the hypothesis that the collaborative rating mechanism can persis-
tently stimulate the users to rate more articles. Besides, an evident correlation was
found between the numbers of times the articles were chosen for summarization and
the articles’ summative ratings, which shows that the summative ratings can reflect the
quality of the articles. The users in the test group seemedmore satisfiedwith the ratings
earned by their contributions because their contributions were rated more often than
those in the control group. Apparently, a critical number of user ratings have to be
reached for peer-evaluation based quality evaluation systems to work accurately.
The data showed that the proposed mechanism successfully motivated the users in
the test group to contribute their articles earlier in each discussion period. The overall
number of the contributions in the test group did not exceed the expected number in
most of theweeks.More than half of the users in that groupwere persuaded to contrib-
ute the number of articles that was expected from them or close to this number. These
results show that the mechanism has a positive effect on controlling the overall number
of resources in the system. Besides, it was found that throughout the study, the users
in the test group were consistently more active in reading articles and logging on the
system, two activities that were not rewarded by the mechanisms in either of the two
groups. This indicates that the proposed mechanism is able to ensure more active and
sustained user participation in the online community. According to the results from the
previous evaluation on Comtella and the research by others (Jones and Rafaeli 1999),
the users’ participation level decreases with the aggravation of information overload.
Therefore, the users’ different participation levels in the two groups indicate that the
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level of information overload in the test group was lower than that in the control group.
However, whether information overload was entirely avoided in the test group is still
unknown.
6.2 How to choose the parameters for the mechanism?
There are several more general issues about the design of the mechanism that deserve
discussion. First of all, the group model is “hand-crafted”, rather than generated
from real data from successful online communities, unlike for example, that proposed
by (McLaren et al. 2006). There are many “magic numbers” in the mechanism, for
example, the expected sum of contributions from the whole community on a given
topic (week), the thresholds for reputation values, the exact shapes of the community
reward function and the individual reward function. A possible criticism to our meth-
odology is that the results may depend on the appropriate setting of the values while
we give no guideline about how these values should be set. However, it is not our goal
to prove that a certain set of values is better than another; in fact we believe, similar
to (Alfonseca et al. 2006), that since the numbers are empirically derived, there is no
optimal set of values, since it would be impossible to compare the effects of different
numbers in exactly the same conditions. However, we believe, that there is a range of
acceptable values, leaving a freedom of choice to the community administrator (e.g.
instructor) depending on the goals of the community, the characteristics of commu-
nity contributions (e.g. average quality, timeliness), and contribution dynamics. We
believe that setting these parameters for particular community can be achieved by
using simulations calibrated with empirical data from previous usage of the system
in a similar type of community. Some of our current work uses system dynamics-
based modeling and simulation to explore further how to select appropriate values
for the parameters and appropriate shapes of reward functions to fit better a given
community “character” and purpose.
Our choice of values for ratings (just +1 or −1 in Comtella) deserves some discus-
sion, since other systems deploy a larger spectrumof values. Allowing for a wider scale
of options generally increases the cognitive load of rating. Also it does not necessarily
allow a better way to capture the quality of a reading, since it involves many aspects,
such as readability, interestingness, popularity of the topic, originality, technical qual-
ity, etc. We considered allowing the students to rate separately each of these aspects.
However, this would increase the complexity of rating action and finally discourage
them from rating. In the current rating system, the users give an overall evaluation on
the article based on their personal attitude to it (hopefully, a resulting form an implicit
evaluation of the combination of all the abovementioned aspects), which is easy to do,
similar to voting. From the analysis of the papers that ended up with high-ratings, we
found that in such a rating system, the readability, originality and brevity of the paper
were more important factors for the students than the paper’s technical or academic
quality. This was somewhat in line with the pedagogical goals of the class instructor,
who encouraged the use of Comtella mostly to achieve a broad overview and ensure
novely/freshenss of cases and stories, rather than depth and argumentation.
6.3 What is an appropriate “objective” measure for the quality of ratings?
An interesting issue to debate is whether it is appropriate to use the average rating
that a resource has obtained so far as a measure for the quality of subsequent ratings.
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Recall that the quality of a rating for a given resource is computed as reciprocal to
the difference between the rating and the average of the ratings that the resource
has received so far. Does this mean that the average taste should “rule”? There are
arguments in both directions. On one side, the average taste of the community, for
example in a system applied in educational context, like Comtella, may tend toward
more superficial, easy to read articles, which was the case in our experiment. In
communities with users that are trusted to have high quality standards, or who are
expected to define the quality standards of the community (e.g. the instructor in an
educational community), it is possible to take the ratings of these users as standard,
even when they have not rated every single resource.
Unlike Slashdot, we did not weight differently the ratings coming from different
users. This is possible to do, but it may put too much onus on measuring the quality of
ratings, since users who tend to rate similarly to what later turns out to be the average
rating will gain more “voting power” thus creating a circular self-reinforcing emphasis
towards the “average”. Since we do not have publicly known and trusted “modera-
tors” to steer consciously through their ratings towards the values of the community,
such a circular weighted scheme may create an additional undue bias in the system
towards the average taste. Yet, we could incorporate easily weighted ratings in future,
with dedicated evaluators.
Differential mechanisms for trust and reputation, which can be applied to prop-
agate trust in the rating abilities of community members based on the similarity
between their ratings can be used to provide personalized ratings rather than overall
community ratings. Algorithms developed in the area of collaborative filtering sys-
tems (Herlocker et al., 2000) can be applied to find clusters of users with similar tastes
based on commonly rated resources and use them to extrapolate anticipated ratings
that these users would give to unrated resources and recommend articles that these
users would likely like.
6.4 Design to prevent gaming the system
Many of the decisions guiding the design of the incentive mechanism and the corre-
sponding user interface (what information is shown and what is not, what is shown on
the same screen, etc.) were made to “outsmart” the users who we envisaged would
attempt to game the system. For example, we developed the adaptive motivational
mechanism to deal with the cognitive overload in the community, caused by exces-
sive contributions by users trying to game the system, motivated by the hierarchical
membership mechanism, i.e. the very need to develop the new adaptive incentive
mechanism came from the presence of gamers.
Another example—we did not show in the table of search results who contributed
each resource to prevent users from shilling, i.e. forming cliques of friends rating each
others’ contributions high to earn higher reputation for sharing resources. Showing the
contributor of each resource would have been beneficial in creating a feeling of com-
munity, in discovering users with similar interests and in navigating the search results.
The average rating of a resource was also not shown in the list of search results (the
only place where the users can rate resources), but instead the summative rating was
shown. This made it difficult/impossible for the users to infer the average rating. The
reason was that we wanted to prevent users from gaming the system by submitting
ratings close to the current average. This would have been an easy way for them to
increase their reputations in rating.
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Another obvious way to game the system is to submit meaningless ratings without
bothering to read the resource. In this way a user can quickly earn a lot of c-points,
which can be invested to increase the visibility of user’s own contributions and there-
fore, their chance to be rated. Of course, this does not necessarily bring benefit to the
user, especially if the resource attracts negative ratings. Yet, to alleviate the danger
of this form of gaming, the interface was designed to allow sorting the search results
by any of the criteria shown on the first line of the table of results (see Fig. 5): by the
total number of ratings received, by the number of view times, alphabetically by title,
etc. However, most users did not use the sort options but relied on the default sorting
(by c-points and then by time), which shows prominently the “sponsored” links.
We do not allow users to modify the rating they have made on papers. As soon
as the rating was given by the user, it could not be taken back and a certain amount
of c-points was awarded immediately to the user. This decision was made to protect
the system from users who would try to game the system and earn c-point through
rating the same articles multiple times. Yet, it would have been perhaps good to have
an option to reverse a rating given, if the user honestly changes her mind about the
article.
To prevent users from stocking up too many c-points, which would give them too
much power to promote their own contributions, users have a limited number of rat-
ings that they can give away, defined by their membership level. Also to ensure rating
activity on a regular basis, we introduced “expiry date” for c-points.
To prevent users from going into bidding wars in “sponsoring” their contributions,
we allowed only a limited number of c-points to be invested in a contribution, and all
invested c-points were rounded down, i.e. two resources with 32 or 37 c-points, even
though they will be sorted correctly, are displayed as 30+ in the list of results, as shown
in Fig. 1.
Yet, of course our current design is not unbeatable.An incentivemechanismevokes
the “sleeping computer gamers” inmany users by providing a challenge for their inge-
nuity. It seems that this cycle of “design to prevent gaming” is typical for all incentive-
based systems. Optimizing utility to reap the maximum benefits by investing minimal
efforts seems to be a basic feature in human economic behavior (Levitt and Dubner
2005). Instead of looking pessimistically at these findings, we prefer to look at the
attempts to game as evidence that the mechanism has a strong motivational effect on
users, even if not exactly as intended.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
To achieve a sustainable level of user participation in online communities, it is impor-
tant to control the quality and the quantity of users’ contributions and avoid informa-
tion overload or degrade its level. Therefore, an incentive mechanism with adaptive
rewards was designed and evaluated in a case study. The mechanism includes two
parts. The collaborative rating mechanism ensures a decentralized way of measuring
the quality of contributions by encouraging the users to rate eachother’s contributions.
Based on this quality measurement, the adaptive rewards mechanism encourages
users’ contributions differently, taking into account the users’ individual reputation
and the current needs of the community.
The results from the case study showed that the proposed mechanism worked
well in the online community, and was able to achieve most of the goals as desired.
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Although the results of the case studies of the proposedmechanisms are quite positive
and exciting, there are still some questions that have not been answered by the study
and also some very interesting directions that deserve further research.
First, it is still unknown whether the proposed mechanism is able to improve the
quality of the resources in online community. The results from the questionnaire about
the quality of shared articles are unable to answer the question about which group as
a whole produced higher-quality contributions.We suppose that the articles in the test
group are of higher quality since they were read more frequently by users. However,
more work is needed to prove this hypothesis. One possible solution is to invite a new
group of students or an expert to evaluate the articles shared in both systems. For
example, we may have them rate the articles on a one to five scale and then calculate
and compare the average ratings for the articles in both groups. Because none of them
have contributed any of the articles, their opinions would be more unbiased.
The performance of the collaborative rating system can be improved. It was found
that a higher number of user ratings could make the quality evaluation more accu-
rate. However, when the number of ratings reaches the critical level, the summative
ratings will converge toward the community measure of quality of the resources, and
more ratings will not improve the accuracy of the evaluation. It would be valuable to
find out the critical number of user ratings for the peer-based rating systems to work
properly. When this threshold is known, the rewards for rating can be adapted so that
rating articles is rewardedmore before the threshold is reached. Finding the threshold
seems to be a statistical question based on the variance of the ratings. Also, ratings
themselves are dependent on the experience, care, and skill of the rater. Finally, the
rating of an article has a time function; the second article to address the same small
detail of the weekly topic is not worth as much as the first one. Amathematical model
with these properties can be build, but it will need to be calibrated, and for this a
large amount of ratings will be necessary to ensure that they are converging. This is
an interesting direction for future work.
In addition, the problem that some good articles may be never read by others than
the original providers andmay end upwith no ratings remains unsolved. To encourage
users to rate unrated articles, it is possible to offer the first rater of the article some
extra benefit, especially if the article eventually ends up with a high-rating.
A personalized recommender system can be applied to help the users to overcome
the problem of information overload. Although the adaptive reward mechanism has
proved to be capable of lowering the level of information overload in the online
community, the problem cannot be completely eliminated, especially for large-scale
online systems with thousands of users. It would become much harder to control the
overall quantity of the contributions in the system if the user population keeps increas-
ing, since its diversity will also increase and the ratings will become less meaningful.
Therefore, providing personalized recommendations for users based on the ratings
given by users with a history of giving similar ratings will allow to reduce the search
results list and may help them to filter out the information they do not want.
Some changes in the adaptive reward mechanism will be needed, if it is applied for
different kind of online communities. The adaptive rewardmechanismwas designed in
the context of a community for sharing class-related resources. The main characteris-
tics of this type of community is that it is closed (a class with fixed number of students)
and that the topic for sharing resources in the system is changed weekly and at any
given time there is only one active topic being discussed. Therefore, the evaluation of
users’ contributions and reputation and the updating of the users’ memberships follow
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aweekly rhythm.However, in open interest-based online communities, like discussion
forums, blog-systems, collaborative filtering systems, etc., usually contributions are
made simultaneously inmany forums/categories and there is no time limit to thepartic-
ipation in each forum/category.Despite these differences, it is still possible tomotivate
or control users’ contributions based on the quality data of their previous contribu-
tions.We could build the user’s reputation of making contributions on all the topics or
on each topic separately, depending on the specifics of the community. The discussion
on some categories is ephemeral. For these categories, it is necessary to encourage
users to contribute early because later contributions may not get enough notice.
In a small team-like community, where the members are expected to collaborate to
achieve a common goal, it may be possible to motivate participation without rewards.
Just providing awareness of the common state of tasks or resources, through a shared
coordinating representation, as in (Introne and Alterman 2006), showing the current
levels of different kinds of contributions, may be sufficient to motivate users to par-
ticipate. Every online community has its own characteristics. We do not believe that
it would be possible to find universal mechanisms that are perfect for all systems.
However, the ideas of rewarding desirable activities, assigning different status and
service to users to arouse comparison and adapting users’ reward to influence their
contributions can be applied widely.
Finally, it would be very interesting to explore deeper the affective impact of the
incentive mechanism and its influence on the users’ motivation to participate. Mast-
hoff and Gatt’s work (2006) suggests a way of building affective models of users
in terms of satisfaction and embarrassment in a group recommender system. Their
approach may be applicable in our case, since the visualization of the users’ status
or any kind of participation metric is likely to cause exactly these emotions. How
these emotions relate to motivation for participation is not clear now, but it might be
another direction for future work.
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